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Abstract 
This paper critically examines recent changes in markets for home (domiciliary) care services in 
England.  During the 1990s, the introduction of competition between private (for-profit and 
charitable) organisations and local authority providers of long-term care services aimed to 
create a ‘mixed economy’ of supply.  More recently, care markets have undergone further 
reforms through the introduction of direct payments and personal budgets.  Underpinned by 
discourses of user choice, these mechanisms aim to offer older people increased control over 
the public resources for their care, thereby introducing further competitive pressures within 
local care markets.   
 
The paper presents early evidence of these changes on:  
 The commissioning and contracting of home care services by local authorities and 
individual older people.  
 The experiences and outcomes for individual older people using home care services.  
 
Drawing on evidence from two recent empirical studies, the paper describes how the new 
emphasis on choice and competition is being operationalized within six local care markets.  
There are suggestions of small increases in user agency and in opportunities for older people 
to receive more personalised home care, in which the quality of care-giving relationships can 
also be optimised.  However, the paper also presents early evidence of increases in risk and 
costs associated with the expansion of competition and choice, both for organisations 
providing home care services and for individual older service users.    
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Introduction  
This paper draws on evidence from two recent studies into the impacts of recent changes in 
markets for home (domiciliary) care services in England.  During the 1990s quasi-markets were 
introduced into home care services, involving competition between private (for profit and 
charitable) organisations and traditional local authority (public) providers of services.  Since 
the turn of the century, both the nature and reach of competitive pressures in the home care 
sector have been further transformed through the introduction of cash direct payments and 
personal budgets (PBs).  Underpinned by discourses of user choice, these recent reforms aim 
to shift responsibility and command over the financial resources for purchasing services 
towards individual service users, thus creating a ‘mixed economy’ of purchasing to 
complement the earlier ‘mixed economy’ of supply.   
 
The paper examines the early impacts of these changes:  
 On local authorities’ commissioning and contracting practices, and the extent to which 
these have increased opportunities for older people to receive flexible, responsive and 
good quality home care services. 
 On older people’s behaviour as informed and empowered consumers exercising choice 
over the public resources available to fund their home care.  
 On the outcomes for older service users, particularly their receipt of home care that is 
responsive to individual needs and preferences and that optimises opportunities to create 
the relationships between the givers and receivers of care that are widely argued 
(Jochimsen 2003; Himmelweit 2007; Lewis and West 2013) to be at the heart of good 
quality care.  
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The paper argues that significant measures have been introduced that aim to make home care 
provision more responsive to the preferences and priorities of users.  However, there is only 
modest evidence that these have led to increases in older people acting as empowered and 
informed consumers, able to make demands on providers for home care that meets individual 
needs and preferences.  The overall thrust of recent reforms has been to extend and intensify 
competition, both between formal home care provider organisations and between these and 
less formal sources of care.  However, early evidence suggests that this increased competition 
has also increased both risk and costs, financial and non-material, at organisational and 
individual levels.    
 
The next section of the paper outlines the policy background leading to the introduction of 
personal budgets in England and the consumerist discourse underpinning these changes.  The 
following section briefly summarises the data and methods employed in the two studies on 
which the paper draws.  The fourth section presents the studies’ findings on the 
commissioning and contracting practices of local authorities and their potential impacts on 
providers of home care services.  The fifth section presents findings concerning the 
experiences and outcomes for older people using personal budgets to fund home care.  The 
final section suggests some tentative conclusions.  
 
Policy background  
User choice and the mixed economy of care 
Until 1993, English local authorities were both funders and providers of domiciliary, residential 
and day care services for older people.  Major reforms in 1993 assigned to local authorities 
lead responsibility for assessing needs and funding social care services and introduced 
competition between public, private and voluntary service providers.  Quality, efficiency and 
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innovation in publicly-funded services were to be stimulated through competition between 
providers (Le Grand 1991; Lewis and Glennerster 1996; Means et al. 2002).  Social workers 
became ‘care managers’, responsible for conducting individual assessments and purchasing 
care from those providers with whom the local authority had contracts (Means et al. 2003).  
Market and consumer choices were therefore effectively exercised by care managers on behalf 
of service users (Baxter et al. 2011).  These reforms were largely successful in stimulating a 
mixed economy in the supply of home care services.  In 1992, the private sector supplied only 
two per cent of all domiciliary care (home help) contact hours; by 2013 this had increased to 
89 per cent (Humphries 2013).   
 
Over the same period, organizations of working age disabled people campaigned for support in 
the form of cash payments rather than services in kind, so they could employ their own care 
workers (personal assistants - PAs) (Morris 2006).  Legislation allowing local authorities to 
make cash direct payments was introduced in 1997 for working age disabled people and, from 
2000, for older people (aged 65 and older), parents of disabled children, carers and disabled 
young people (Glasby and Littlechild 2006).    
However, relatively few people chose direct payments and take-up was highly variable 
between older and younger disabled people and between localities.  Research identified a 
range of factors affecting the willingness of older people to engage with local care markets as 
individual purchasers, including a lack of brokerage and support services; anxieties about 
managing direct payments; shortages of people willing to be employed as PAs; and 
professional resistance by care managers anxious about threats to traditional social work 
practice and/or increased risk (Ellis 2007; Fernández et al. 2007).  Despite intensive policy 
pressures, by 2009 still only 3.6 percent of older people receiving publicly-funded care had this 
in the form of direct payments (Care Quality Commission 2010).  Therefore, for most older 
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people home care services continued to be procured by local authorities using large block or 
cost-and-volume contracts, often based on geographical zones, with home care provider 
agencies.  Such contracts optimised technical efficiency by minimising transaction costs for 
local authority purchasers. They also guaranteed work and income to provider agencies, 
enabling them to build and maintain staff capacity in particular localities and thereby minimise 
travel time and costs. However, large block contracts offered few incentives to providers to 
improve the quality of care.  Nor did they provide appropriate incentives to provide services 
characterised by flexibility and responsiveness to individual user choice (Wilberforce et al. 
2012).   
 
From around 2000, a new choice-based consumerist discourse began to shape social care 
policy.  This aimed to promote user control, intensifying earlier trajectories of squeezing 
provider and professional interests: 
 
 By putting users at the heart of services, enabling them to become participants in the 
design and delivery, services will be more effective by mobilizing millions of people as  
 
the co-producers of the public goods they value.  
(Leadbeater 2004: 19-20) 
  
This discourse led to increased pressures to devolve agency and command over public 
resources for care to individual service users themselves.  It was also alleged to involve 
transfers of risk, from the state to the private sector and to older service users themselves, as 
well as raising concerns about equity and about the capacity of both local authorities and 
7 
 
private sector service providers to deliver on ambitious policy goals (Needham 2007).  The 
evidence presented in this paper sheds light on these concerns.   
 
Leading the implementation of this new approach was a social enterprise organization In 
Control, that initially supported learning disabled adults to take a bigger role in planning their 
own support arrangements through personal budgets (PBs).  Whereas direct payments had up 
till now generally been used to employ personal assistants (PAs) to provide personal and 
domestic care, In Control encouraged much greater flexibility in how PBs were used, including 
paying friends and relatives or purchasing mainstream services such as art classes or gym 
membership rather than attending special day centres (Duffy 2004).  
 
Building on In Control’s experience, and despite equivocal evidence from rigorous evaluation 
of pilot schemes (Glendinning et al. 2008; Moran et al. 2012), from 2009 all English local 
authorities were required to offer PBs to all adults eligible for publicly-funded community-
based (ie non-residential) social care (Department of Health 2008).   
 
‘Personal budget’ describes the public resources allocated to an individual to fund their 
domiciliary and/or community-based support.   PBs can be taken as a cash direct payment, 
held and managed by the older person in a designated bank account and used to employ a PA; 
purchase home care directly from a provider agency; pay relatives or friends for giving help; or 
buy mainstream services such as taxis or ready-made meals.  PBs can also be held by the local 
authority on behalf of the individual and used to pay for council-commissioned services.  This 
is by far the most common option for older people; 80 per cent of older people have their 
budget managed in this way and used to fund home care services (Baxter et al. 2013; Rabiee et 
al. 2013).  A third option is for the budget to be held and managed by a third party – an 
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individual such as a carer or an organisation that also provides accountancy, recruitment and 
payroll services.  This third party option includes the budget being held by a service provider 
such as a home care agency and used as and when the older person needs it; this is sometimes 
called an Individual Service Fund (ISF).  By March 2012, just over half of all adults potentially 
eligible for PBs had one in place (ADASS 2012).   
 
These different deployment options offer varying levels of opportunity for older people to 
behave as active ‘consumers’ of home care services, using PBs to exercise agency within local 
care markets in order to influence the content, timing and manner in which their home care is 
delivered.  These variations are represented diagrammatically below: at one end of the 
continuum are council-managed PBs, where the local authority acts as a proxy purchaser on 
behalf of the older person; at the other end is the direct payment option where an individual 
older person manages the resources allocated for her/his care and uses these to engage 
directly with local markets of formal or informal care providers (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Personal budget deployment options  
LOW                HIGH
  
Council managed personal 
budget  
Individual service fund         User held Direct payment 
Council contract framework 
agreement with home care 
provider; council purchases care 
for individual older person from 
contracted provider  
Council contracts with 
provider; provider 
negotiates detailed 
arrangements with 
older person within 
overall budget  
Older person uses direct payment 
to purchase home care directly 
from provider agency 
Older person uses direct payment to:   
  
Employ friend/ 
acquaintance   
Employ personal 
assistant not 
previously known  
 
Opportunities for user 
purchasing power  
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These options suggest a range of potential impacts on local home care provider markets.  They 
include new opportunities for small providers wishing to attract business from PB-holders and 
therefore not dependent on large local authority contracts nor requiring the expertise and 
infrastructure to bid for large contracts, to enter the market.  New providers also suggest 
increased competition, both between formal home care service provider organisations and 
between these and individually employed PAs, for the business of older people looking to 
spend their PBs.   Increased competition should, in theory, lead to improvements in service 
quality and responsiveness, reinforced by greater  ease with which individual PB-holding 
purchasers can exit from arrangements with providers they are dissatisfied with (Baxter et al. 
2011).  On the other hand, the fact that the majority of older people currently opt for the local 
authority to manage their PB and purchase council-commissioned services suggests the 
continued presence of large, monopsony purchasers.  This presence may constrain the scope 
of potential developments in local care markets.   It also raises the question of how far 
increased opportunities to engage in market-related choice behaviours are desired by, or 
available to, the majority of older people whose care remains subject to proxy purchasing by 
local authorities.  
 
The implications of these developments for local home care markets and for the experiences 
and outcomes for older users of home care services were the subject of two research projects.   
 
The research studies 
Two recent studies examined the implementation and outcomes of new opportunities created 
by PBs for older people to have greater command over the public funding allocated for their 
care and greater control over the care delivered through that funding.  Both studies included 
interviews with local authority staff responsible for commissioning and contracting home care 
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services and with older people receiving home care funded through PBs.  Together, the data 
from the two studies covered the full range of possible PB deployment options and provide 
preliminary evidence on their impacts, including the outcomes for local care markets and the 
experiences of older home care service users.  
 
Study 1: Managed personal budgets  
This study focused on the choice and control available to older people whose PBs were held 
and managed by the local authority, or by a service provider as an ISF.  It was conducted in 
three English local authorities that were known to be pro-active in facilitating personalised 
home care services for people using council-managed PBs; had large proportions of older 
people within their populations; and had large proportions of people using managed PBs.  One 
authority covered a large rural county, one was an ethnically diverse London borough and the 
third covered a metropolitan area of north-west England.  
 
Data collection took place between August 2011 and October 2012.  This comprised interviews 
with senior managers from each authority about commissioning, contracting and market 
development activities; focus groups with front-line staff to explore their experiences of 
supporting  older people with managed PBs to make choices and thereby shape demands on 
home care providers; interviews with managers of home care agencies about their experiences 
of providing support to people using managed PBs; and interviews with 18 older people 
(without dementia) using managed PBs, who were recruited from the home care agencies. The 
latter interviews explored the older people’s perceptions of the choices available to them over 
who provided their care, the timing and content of the home care they received; their 
opportunities to shape the delivery of care to their individual routines and preferences; and 
their satisfaction with the care they received.  All interviews and focus groups were digitally 
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recorded and transcribed; data were analysed using the Framework approach (Ritchie and 
Spencer 1994).  
 
Study 2: Direct payments  
This study focused on the choices made by older people who had recently opted to take their 
PB as a direct payment; the reasons for the specific deployment option chosen; and the 
outcomes of these choices.  The study took place in three London local authorities: all had 
larger numbers of home care agencies and therefore relatively competitive markets; and large 
(absolute and relative) numbers of older people taking their PBs as direct payments.   
 
Interviews were conducted with commissioning managers and social workers with knowledge 
of personal budget processes in each authority about procedures for assessing and allocating 
PBs and the local care market.  The authorities also identified people aged 60 and older who 
had been allocated a PB in the form of a direct payment for the first time in the past year and 
had the necessary cognitive capacity to be interviewed (or relatives willing to be interviewed 
as proxies).  Purposive sampling within this frame aimed to recruit equal numbers of older 
people who used their direct payment PB to purchase care from an agency; hire a previously 
unknown person to work as a PA; or employ an acquaintance or relative as a PA.      
 
Twenty-four older people were interviewed between March and May 2013.  Interviews 
covered their decision to opt for the direct payment form of PB; the choices of agency or PA; 
negotiation of care tasks; and  their satisfaction with the care received.  Most interviewees 
were very frail and a significant proportion of interviews took place with proxy respondents; 
the latter were all either co-resident or close relatives and therefore familiar with the older 
person’s preferences (Lee et al. 2004).  
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All interviews were digitally audio-recorded with permission from interviewees, transcribed 
verbatim and analysed with MAXQDA software using the Framework approach (Ritchie and 
Lewis 2003).  
 
Changes in local authority commissioning and contracting practices 
As existing block contracts with home care provider organisations began to expire, local 
authorities in both studies were replacing these with framework agreements.  Framework 
agreements set prices and quality standards but do not guarantee providers any volume of 
work or income.  The six study authorities were at different stages in moving  from block 
contracts; for example, in one authority (Study 2) around half the home care agencies still had 
block contracts and were therefore guaranteed work and income until these expired (within a 
year).  
 
Senior commissioning managers and front-line staff argued that framework agreements 
allowed them to procure individual or personalised care services from home care service 
providers for older people with council-managed PBs.  Framework agreements were praised by 
care managers as they offered greater flexibility; as proxy purchasers, they were not required 
to purchase from providers that had been guaranteed (and expected funding for) specified 
numbers of clients or hours.  Framework agreements were also not restricted to specific 
geographic zones, thus enabling care managers to purchase care from a wider range of 
agencies and offer older people greater choice between potential home care service providers.  
Framework agreements were widely believed by local authorities to increase competition and 
drive up quality, in contrast to block contracts.  
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“It’s probably generated an element of competitiveness, […] they [providers] have to be 
constantly proving themselves and proving their worth and being prepared to sign up to 
what our requirements are.”  
(Care manager, Study 1) 
 
This view was particularly marked in one local authority (Study 1) which had over 40 home 
care service providers on its framework agreement.   Another authority (Study 2) had only four 
providers on its framework agreement but aimed to stimulate competition by replacing these 
every three years. 
 
However, these more flexible, purchasing arrangements also introduced new risks and 
additional costs.  To complement framework agreements, local authorities in Study 1 had 
introduced new ‘broker’ roles - local authority staff acting as market intermediaries between 
the front line care managers who assessed the care needs and PB levels of individual older 
people and the home care service providers.  Brokers sent out the basic details about potential 
clients and their support needs to all framework providers asking if they were able to provide 
their specified levels of care.  Details of providers that responded were then given to care 
managers, who would ask the older person to select their preferred provider.  However, both 
local authority care managers and home care provider agency managers were concerned that 
brokers knew little about individual older people and their needs; they worked through emails 
and paper and did not meet service users. This generated a lot of ‘to-ing and fro-ing’ between 
local authority staff and home care service providers to ensure that older people’s preferences 
could be met.  Indeed, in one authority (Study 1), the brokerage system was reported to create 
such delays that local authority care managers by-passed brokers and contacted home care 
agencies directly, only asking brokers to finalise arrangements once these had been agreed 
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informally with the agency.   Agency managers also reported preferring to negotiate directly 
with care managers about new clients.  For example, they reported having offers to take new 
clients who lived close to existing clients turned down by brokers who were unaware of their 
geographical proximity, thus preventing the more efficient geographical clustering of visits.   
 
Because they provided no guarantee of work or income, framework agreements also 
introduced new risks for home care service providers and for the stability of the local markets.  
Thus several authorities across the two studies had initially placed only relatively few home 
care providers on their framework agreements in order to ensure a reasonable amount of 
work to each, thereby safeguarding their financial viability, market stability and home care 
service capacity across the authority as a whole.  However this had the effect of reducing 
choice for older people.  Even in a large rural authority with over 40 home care service 
providers on its framework agreement (Study 1), local authority care managers thought there 
was still insufficient choice of home care provider; often only one provider was able to provide 
the care advertised by the council brokers.  Care managers in other authorities reported that it 
remained very difficult to meet specialised needs (for example for carers from specific ethnic 
or cultural backgrounds) through framework agreements.  
 
The tensions between competition, market stability and choice were also recognised by the 
managers of home care service providers.  On the one hand, framework agreements allowed 
them to select clients from any geographical area and also turn down new referrals - options 
that were not available under the former block contracts if they were below their contracted 
minimum volume.  This gave them greater control over their staffing and workloads.  On the 
other hand, provider managers were aware of the risk of having more agencies on a 
framework agreement.  The increased competition risked increasing  pressures to accept all 
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the clients they were offered; this could in turn reduce opportunities to group clients 
geographically, with consequences for maintaining efficiency by employing local care staff and 
reducing travelling time.    
 
Providing home care to older people with local authority managed PBs under framework 
agreements was not the only source of business available to home care providers.  Older 
people taking their PBs in the form of a cash direct payment could also use this to purchase 
services from home care providers.  One local authority (Study 2) had recognised this as an 
opportunity to help protect local home care service providers against the potential instability 
introduced by framework agreements.  It had negotiated an agreement that local providers 
would charge direct payment holders the same (lower) rates for their home care services that 
they charged council-managed PB holders, thus sustaining demand for home care providers’ 
services.  In contrast, however, another authority (also Study 2) expected local home care 
service providers to compete for, and generate additional income from, the higher charges 
that direct payment holders (as well as those funding their own care privately) were expected 
to pay.  Initially home care providers in both these authorities expressed anxiety that increased  
numbers of older people using direct payments to purchase home care directly from agencies 
could increase agencies’ exposure to late payment and debts, although this new risk had so far 
not materialised.  
 
The transition to framework agreements was accompanied by some devolution of 
responsibilities to home care providers for devising detailed care plans with older people with 
local authority managed PBs and for initiating reviews of these plans as needs and preferences 
changed.  Some home care providers also reported having greater freedom to negotiate 
directly with clients exactly how their managed PB would be used; they were allowed by their 
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respective councils to adjust the details of care plans in agreement with clients, without 
seeking permission from the authority.  However, significant restrictions on this flexibility were 
also reported.  Some authorities imposed blanket prohibitions on the use of PBs for house 
cleaning or any tasks other than personal care.  Only a few home care agencies reported their 
clients were able to save PB-funded time, for example if a routine visit was cancelled, and 
‘bank’ this for later use.  Both providers and older people reported that local authorities 
‘clawed back’ any unused time on the grounds that the funding was not needed.  Moreover it 
was rare for providers to be given PBs to manage on behalf of older people as ISFs; instead 
they invoiced the local authority retrospectively for care they had provided.  
 
“The local authorities are still going to want to hold the purse strings, so ISFs, yes it still 
can work and I think it can work in a fantastic way, but as I say unless the local 
authorities are prepared to let go of that funding and trust the ... service provider ... […] 
money’s so tight now.”  
(Home care provider manager Study 1) 
 
Indeed, only one of the six study authorities (Study 2) had established ISF arrangements, with 
four local home care providers who managed PBs on behalf of older clients; this arrangement 
had been set up for people who took their budget as a cash direct payment and used it to buy 
home care from provider agencies.  Here direct payment users chose one of the four providers 
and the local authority transferred the direct payment to the provider, which was then 
responsible for managing it.  The stated aims were to relieve older people of the responsibility 
of managing a direct payment and to increase opportunities to devise care plans directly with 
the agency.   
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Across the six councils, some measures had been introduced to support older people who 
opted to take their PB as a cash direct payment and engage directly with their local home care 
markets – both formal and informal - as individual ‘consumers’.  In one authority, council 
brokers would negotiate between individual direct payment holders and home care providers 
over the timing and content of home care services.  In a second council, these functions were 
carried out by a third sector, user-led organisation commissioned specifically to support direct 
payment holders.  Two authorities offered pre-paid cards linked to a bank account held by the 
local authority; direct payment holders were issued with the card and used it to pay home care 
providers for the services provided.  In one local authority a third sector organisation had 
recently been commissioned to recruit a pool of people wishing to work as PAs; this 
organisation helped direct payment holders to identify and hire a PA.    
 
The experiences of older people – ‘consumers’ of home care?  
Combining evidence from the two studies enabled a comparison of the experiences of older 
people who had chosen different options for deploying their PBs and who were therefore 
engaging with local home care markets with different levels of opportunity to exercise  choice 
as ‘consumers’ of home care services.  What were the outcomes of the various deployment 
options, in terms of receiving services that were flexible and responsive to changes in 
circumstances and preferences?  In particular, were those deployment options that offered 
more extensive user control reflected in accounts of more individualised and responsive home 
care?  
 
Older people whose PBs were managed by the local authority all reported having little choice 
over which agency provided their care.  This was consistent with the caution of local 
authorities in not allowing too many home care providers onto the new framework 
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agreements; usually only one provider was able to respond to brokers’ advertisements.   
However, this lack of choice was not a concern; older people either thought they lacked the 
information and skills to make choices between providers or had felt too unwell at the time to 
be able to absorb the necessary information and take responsibility for evaluating alternatives.  
 
Much more important were variations in opportunities to develop relationships with regular 
care workers.  Older people with local authority-managed PBs reported being visited by the 
same small team of care workers and they valued this.  A few interviewees reported having 
been able to change particular care workers they did not get on with, while older people from 
minority ethnic communities reported their cultural and religious preferences were respected 
by care workers.  Thus, even within the constraints of local authority managed PBs, older 
people reported being able to develop relationships with their small team of care workers.  
This enabled older people sometimes to ask for additional small tasks to be carried out ‘off the 
care plan’; sometimes care workers themselves offered to undertake these (for example, 
collecting shopping on the way to a home visit).   
 
Nevertheless, older people with local authority-managed PBs still wanted more flexibility over 
how the time funded through their  PB was used and the tasks that made up their day-to-day 
care – for example, being able to shorten several routine visits and ‘bank’ the saved time for a 
longer visit or outing at a later date.  Others would have liked a few unallocated hours each 
month to use flexibly.   
 
Those older people who had opted to take their PB as a cash direct payment did so often 
because of previous unsatisfactory experiences with local authority-commissioned home care. 
They reported earlier difficulties in getting the services they wanted or providers to accept 
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them as clients, lack of continuity or delays in receiving care.  With the direct payment option, 
they reported significant improvements in satisfaction, with greater flexibility and control over 
their care schedules, improvements in care workers’ punctuality and greater responsiveness to 
changing preferences.  Those who used direct payments to employ a PA also reported greater 
flexibility over the timing and range of tasks undertaken.    
 
“And she is very, very flexible actually. She is very good. She will do things which are 
perhaps not entirely in her remit... but don't tell anybody that ‘cause it might get her 
into trouble [laughter]”. 
(Older person Study 2) 
 
This flexibility included being able to adapt daily routines to changing needs or schedules.   
Underpinning such flexibility were extensive informal arrangements between direct payment 
users and PAs which included clear notions of reciprocity.  These were evident when agreeing 
care schedules – where overtime or early visits were ‘repaid’ later by shorter shifts – and 
included symbolic exchanges of ‘gifts’ or social support, for example, when older people gave 
advice on non-care related issues to a foreign-born PA.  It appeared therefore, that greater 
command over care-related resources offered increased scope for the relational dimensions of 
care-giving to develop between older people and their care workers.  Those employing PAs 
often reported developing deep, reciprocal relationships with their carers.  Even those using  
their direct payments to purchase care from formal service provider organisations reported 
developing and sustaining close relationships with individual care workers; a few even 
reported moving to a different provider in order to keep a particular carer if the latter moved 
employer.   
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“Yeah, that’s important because you need to feel comfortable with the person that 
comes into your home.”  
(Older person Study 2)  
 
However, the benefits of this enhanced agency had costs in terms of increased uncertainty and 
responsibility.  Recruiting a PA not previously known to an older person caused considerable 
anxiety; this issue was so salient that some of these older people had used their direct 
payment PB to purchase care from a formal service provider.  Conversely (and similar to those 
older people with local authority managed PBs), those who used direct payments to purchase 
care from an agency reported less freedom to choose the identity of their carers, but this was 
offset by reduced anxiety and stress.   
 
“I just sort of thought, oh well if I go with this agency [name omitted due to 
confidentiality], the manager there [name omitted due to confidentiality] is pretty 
accommodating with finding the right sort of people.” 
(Older person Study 2) 
 
To reduce this uncertainty, acquiring information on a potential home care provider or PA 
employee was paramount. Recommendations came from friends, neighbours employing carers 
or support agencies.    Uncertainties and risks remained even after PAs had been recruited, as 
older people still had to find temporary cover for holidays or illness.  Here existing 
relationships with PAs were valuable, as the latter could suggest acquaintances who might be 
willing to act as temporary replacements.   Even so, some older people who had optimised 
their consumer choice by employing PAs still felt that an agency would be able to offer better 
backup in these situations or provide them with added reassurance about the identity and 
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competences of the PA.  Finally, agencies were considered better able to handle the 
responsibilities of employing PAs:  
 
“Yeah, ‘cause they know they’re going to be able to handle the paperwork.  Like now 
we are getting too old to do this sort of thing, you know really, I am.  I was never an 
office worker and I could see straight away the problems that may arise with insurance  
and holidays and bookings and all that, you’d be on your own. “ 
(Older person Study 2) 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
Drawing on two relatively small scale, in-depth studies, this paper has reported recent changes 
in England aimed at increasing choice and competition in home care services – whether 
provided by formal service providers or individually employed PAs - so that care can be better 
tailored to individual preferences and needs.  These changes have been underpinned by 
consumerist discourses and have utilised market-related mechanisms as levers for change.  
Specifically, they have aimed to increase competition by placing greater agency in the hands of 
individual older people needing care.  
 
However, many older people appear to be reluctant to or have difficulty taking on the role of 
active consumers.  Thus local authorities have retained a major role as large scale purchasers 
of home care services, albeit with changes to the contractual basis for this role that are 
intended to increase competition.  The shift from block contracts to framework agreements 
involves only minimal devolution of purchasing power to users of home care services or 
relaxation of tight service specifications in the form of agreed care plans.  However the move 
does entail increased risks for home care provider agencies, who are exposed to greater 
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competition and wider market uncertainty.  Attempts to mitigate these risks include limiting 
numbers of providers on local framework agreements – but this in turn reduces the range of 
services and choices available to older people with local authority managed-PBs.  Other 
opportunities for increasing flexibility and choice for those with local authority managed PBs, 
such as ISFs and time banking, were not widely available among the six authorities at the time 
of the studies reported here.  Further research is needed into the longer-term sustainability of 
local home care markets,  under the dual pressures of increased competition and risk. 
 
Turning to the experiences of older people, the findings reported above are consistent with 
earlier evidence of the reported benefits of optimising consumer agency over care provision 
through user-held cash direct payments (Glasby and Littlechild 2009).  Comparing the accounts 
of older people with local authority-managed PBs against those of older people using direct 
payments to engage more closely with local care markets does suggest the latter may 
experience more freedom to shape the timing and content of daily care routines to their 
preferences.  Significantly, the latter group may also have more opportunity to nurture the 
relational aspects of care, through enhanced opportunities to develop close and reciprocal 
relationships with directly employed PAs.  This is a dimension of care that is highly valued and 
associated with higher quality care by end users (Kane and Kane 2001; Lewis and West 2013).   
However, this difference may be relative rather than absolute, as older people with local 
authority managed PBs also reported being able to develop relationships with home care 
agency-employed care workers. 
 
Against these cautious positive conclusions, however, some major concerns arise.  Both 
studies clearly expose the limits to consumerism and the commodification of care.  Not all the 
older interviewees wanted greater choice or acted as empowered consumers of care.  Many 
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did not want to take responsibility into their own hands and therefore opted for local 
authority-managed PBs, trading off the lack of responsibility against the lower levels of choice 
this allowed.  Even amongst those who did opt for direct payments, choosing a home care 
agency or recruiting a personal assistant was daunting and filled with uncertainty, 
compounded by a lack of relevant information.  This illustrates another dimension of wider 
societal shifts from state or corporate, to personal, responsibilities for managing risk, including 
the sense of isolation experienced by newly exposed individuals and families (Hacker 2006).   
Moreover, the older people taking part in both studies emphasised how important the 
relational aspects of care were to them. It is not clear that current consumer-driven reforms 
prioritise this important aspect of the quality of care (see Lewis and West 2013).  
 
Further concerns relate to the additional costs involved in attempts to transform the 
purchasing of care services from large scale enterprises conducted by monopsonic local 
authority purchasers to more individualised purchasing arrangements - whether conducted by 
proxy, with local authorities purchasing care for individual older people through framework 
agreements, or by older direct payment holders themselves.  These costs may be substantial 
and both financial and psychological.  They include the costs of local authority brokers; the 
additional time and other transaction costs incurred by brokers in facilitating the matching of 
demand with supply within framework agreements; and the brokerage and support 
arrangements that enable individual purchasers to search for and purchase appropriate care.  
As Thaler and Sunstein (2008: 158) point out, ‘the more choices you give people, the more 
help you need to provide’.  Wider costs to local care markets and constraints on opportunities 
for individual choices may also be incurred over time, if some home care agencies are unable 
to sustain increases in business risks and competition pressures.  Individual older people also 
reported tensions between exercising greater control over their care and the risks this 
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entailed; indeed, some were willing to trade off reduced agency for a reduction in risk.  Given 
the salience to effective market functioning of good information for both buyers and sellers 
(Baxter et al. 2011) there appeared to be a particular imbalance in the ease of obtaining 
information about formal home care providers compared with potential PA employees.  More 
generally, the evidence tends to support Wilberforce et al.’s (2012) predictions of the 
increased costs associated with improvements in allocative efficiency and Spicker’s (2013) 
scepticism about the cost-effectiveness of personalisation.      
 
The conclusions reported here may change as local authorities and home care providers gain 
experience in managing increased choice and its associated risks, or as more older people take 
their PB as a cash direct payment.  These early findings nonetheless suggest that older people 
with local authority-managed PBs do experience some limited opportunities for flexibility and 
choice over the delivery of their care.  Those with direct payments appeared to have greater 
degrees of control and choice and were better able to tailor care to their needs, even when 
using formal service providers.  But against these gains must be set new risks and additional 
costs; the size and sustainability of both of these, for both organisations and individuals, 
warrant further investigation.  Local authorities are currently experiencing an unprecedented 
period of austerity and restrictions on expenditure and the increased costs of managing more 
personalised local care markets may be difficult to sustain.  
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